Culture

CULTURE.......

Language
: the oldest human institution and the most sophisticated medium of expression.

Arts & Sciences : the most advanced and refined forms of human expression.

Thought : the ways in which people perceive, interpret, and understand the world around them.

Spirituality : the value system transmitted through generations for the inner well-being of human beings, expressed through language and actions.

Social activities : the shared pursuits within a cultural community, demonstrated in a variety of festivities and life-celebrating events.

Interaction : the social aspects of human contact, including the give-and-take of socialization, negotiation, protocols, and conventions.

Thursday, January 31, 2013

THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE CLASS AND AMERICAN POWER


(Transcript of speech given by George Friedman.  George, born 1949 in Budapest, Hungary is an American political scientist and author.  He is founder, chief intelligence officer, financial overseer, and CEO of the private intelligence corporation STRATFOR)  I have slightly edited his report for the purpose of making an easier and quicker read.


The Crisis of the American Middle Class

The median household income of Americans in 2011 was $49,103.  Adjusted for inflation, the median income is just below what it was in 1989 and is $4,000 less than it was in 2000.  Take-home income is a bit less than $40,000 when Social Security and state and federal taxes are included.  That means a monthly income, per household, of about $3,300.  It is urgent to bear in mind that half of all American households earn less than this.  It is also vital to consider not the differences between 1990 and 2011, but the difference between the 1950's-60's and the 21 century.  This is where the difference in the meaning of middle class becomes most apparent.

In the 1950's and 60's, the median income allowed you to live with a single earner -- normally the husband, with the wife typically working as a homemaker -- and roughly 3 children.  It permitted the purchase of modest tract housing, one late model car, and an older one.  It allowed a driving vacation somewhere and, with care, some savings as well.  I know this because my family was lower-middle class, and this is how we lived, and I know many other in my generation who had the same background.  It was not an easy life and many luxuries were denied us, but it was not a bad life at all.

Someone in the median income today might just pull this off, but it would not be easy.  We will assume he/she/they did not have college loans to pay off but do have two car loans totaling $700/mth,  $1,200/mth needed to buy food, clothing, and utilities, $1,400/mth needed for mortgage-real estate taxes-home owners insurance, plus some funds for fixing the air conditioner/dishwasher/etc.  At a 5% mortgage rate, that would allow this family to buy a house in the $200,000 range.  Most likely this person or family would get a refund back on taxes from deductions, but this would be needed to pay off credit card bills used to purchase Christmas presents and dealing with emergencies.

A standard of living consistent with middle class people of the '50s-'60s would be possible, but not done easily and more problematic if living in a major metropolitan area.  If the employer(s) didn't cover health insurance, that $4,000-$5,000 for three or four people would severely limit expenses for this family.  Of course, if buying a home the family would need $20,000 to $40,000 as a down payment and closing costs.  It doesn't take a genius to see that little money is left over for a week at the seashore with the kids.

And this is for the median.  Those below the median -- half of all households -- would be shut out of what is considered the middle-class life.  The basics might be available at the median level, given favorable individual circumstances, but below that, life becomes surprisingly meager.

The Expectation of Upward Mobility

I should pause and mention that this was one of the fundamental causes of the 2007-2008 subprime lending crisis.  People below the median took out loans with deferred interest with the expectation that their incomes would continue the rise that was traditional since World War II.  The caricature of the borrower as irresponsible misses the point.  The expectation of rising real incomes was built into the American culture, and many assumed based on that, the rise would resume in five years.  When it did not, they were trapped.  But given history, they were not making an irresponsible assumption.

American history has always been filled with the assumption that upward mobility was possible.  The Midwest and West opened land that could be exploited, and the massive industrialization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries opened opportunities.  There was a systemic expectation of upward mobility built into American culture and reality.

The Great Depression was a shock to the system, and it was not solved by the New Deal, nor even by World War II alone.  The next drive for upward mobility came from post-war programs for veterans, of whom there were more than 10 million.  These programs were instrumental in creating post-industrial America, by creating a class of suburban professionals.  There were three programs that were critical:

1.  The GI Bill, which allowed veterans to go to college after the war, becoming professionals frequently several notches above their parents.

2.  The part of the GI Bill (VA Loans) that provided federally funded guaranteed mortgages to veterans, allowing low and no down payment mortgages and low interest rates to graduates of publicly funded universities.  

3.  The federally funded Interstate Highway System, which made access to land close to but outside of cities easier, enabling both the dispersal of populations on inexpensive land (which made single family houses possible) and later, the dispersal of business to the suburbs.

There were undoubtedly many other things that contributed to this, but these three not only reshaped America but also created a new dimension to the upward mobility that was built into American life from the beginning.  Moreover, these programs were all directed toward veterans, to whom it was acknowledged a debt was due, or were created for military reasons (the Interstate Highway System was funded to enable the rapid movement of troops from coast to coast, which during World War II was found to be impossible).  As a result, there was a consensus amongst the American people about the moral propriety of the programs.

The subprime fiasco was rooted in the failure to understand that the foundations of middle class life were not under temporary pressure but something more fundamental.  Where a single earner could support a middle class family in the generation after World War II, it now took at least two earners.  This meant that the rise of the double-income family corresponded with the decline of the middle class.  The lower you go on the income scale, the more likely you are to be a single mother.  The shift away from social pressure for two parent homes was certainly part of the problem.

Re-engineering the Corporation

We have also been going through the crisis of the modern corporation.  Corporations provided long term employment for the middle class.  It was not unusual to spend your entire life working for one corporation.  Working for a corporation meant you received yearly pay increases (either as a union or non-union worker).  The middle class had job security and rising income, along with retirement and other benefits.  Over the course of time, the culture of the corporation diverged from the realities, as corporate productivity lagged behind costs and the corporations became more and more dysfunctional and ultimately unsupportable.  In addition, the corporations ceased focusing on doing one thing well and instead became conglomerates, with a management frequently unable to keep up with the complexity of multiple lines of business.

For these and many other reasons, the corporation became inefficient, and in the terms of the 1980's, they had to be re-engineered -- which meant taken apart, pared down, refined and refocused.  And the re-engineering of the corporation, designed to make them agile, meant that there was a permanent revolution in business.  Everything was being reinvented.  Huge amounts of money, managed by people whose specialty was re-engineering companies, were deployed.  The choice was between total failure and radical change.  From the point of view of the individual worker, this frequently meant the same thing:  unemployment.  From the view of the economy, it meant the creation of value whether through breaking up of companies, closing some of them or sending jobs overseas.  It was designed to increase the total efficiency, and it worked for the most part.

This is where the disjuncture occurred.  From the point of view of the investor, they had saved the corporation from total meltdown by redesigning it.  From the point of view of the workers, some retained the jobs that they would have lost, while others lost the jobs they would have lost anyway.  But the important thing is not the subjective bitterness of those who lost their jobs, but something more complex. 

As the permanent corporate jobs declined, more people were starting over.  Some of them were starting over every few years as the agile corporation grew more efficient and needed fewer employees.  That meant that if they got new jobs it would not be at the munificent corporate pay rate but at near entry-level rates in the small companies that were now the growth engine.  As these companies failed, were bought or shifted direction, they would lose their jobs and start over again.  Wages did not rise for them and for long periods they might be unemployed, never to get a job again in their now obsolete fields, and certainly not working at a company for the next 20 years. 

The restructuring of inefficient companies did create substantial value, but that value did not flow to the now laid-off workers.  Some might flow to the remaining workers, but much of it went to the engineers who restructured the companies and the investors they represented.  Statistics reveal that, since 1947 (when the data was first compiled), corporate profits as a percentage of gross domestic product are now at their highest level, while wages as a percentage of GDP are now at their lowest level.  It was not a question of making the economy more efficient -- it did do that -- it was a question of where the value accumulated.  The upper segment of the wage curve and the investors continued to make money.  The middle class divided into a segment that entered the upper-middle class, while another faction sank into the lower-middle class.  [MLF: this gives insight on the disconnect between Wall Street and Main Street]    

American society on the whole was never egalitarian.  It always accepted that there would be substantial differences in wages and wealth.  Indeed, progress was in some ways driven by a desire to emulate the wealthy.  There was also the expectation that while others received far more, the entire wealth structure would rise in tandem.  It was also understood that, because of lack of skill or bad luck, others would lose.

What we are facing now is a structural shift, in which the middle class' center, not because of laziness or stupidity, is shifting downward in terms of standard of living.  It is a structural shift that is rooted in social change (the breakdown of the conventional family) and economic change (the decline of traditional corporations and the creation of corporate agility that places individual workers at a massive disadvantage).

The inherent crisis rests in an increasingly efficient economy and a population that can't consume what is produced because it can not afford the products.  This has happened numerous times in history, but the US, excepting the Great Depression, was the counterexample.

Obviously this is a massive political debate, save that political debates identify problems without clarifying them.  In political debates, someone must be blamed.  In reality, these processes are beyond even the government's ability to control.  On one hand, the traditional corporation was beneficial to the workers until it collapsed under the burden of its costs.  On the other hand, the efficiencies created threaten to undermine consumption by weakening the effective demand among half of society.

The Long Term Threat  

The greatest danger is one that will not be immediately faced (MLF: I disagree and believe it could pose an immediate threat) but it is lurking out there.  The United States was built on the assumption that a rising tide lifts all ships.  That has not been the case for the past generation, and there is no indication that this socio-economic reality will change any time soon.  That means that a core assumption is at risk.  The problem is that social stability has been built around this assumption -- not on the assumption that everyone is owed a living.

If we move to a system where half of the country is either stagnant or losing ground while the other half is surging, the social fabric of this nation is at risk, and with it the massive global power the United States has accumulated.  Other superpowers such as Britain or Rome did not have the idea of a perpetually improving condition of the middle class as a core value.  The United States does.  If it loses that, it loses one of the pillars of its geopolitical power.

The left will argue that the solution is for laws to transfer wealth from the rich to the middle class.  That would increase consumption but, depending on the scope of this wealth transfer, would threaten the amount of capital available to investment and eliminate incentives to invest.  You can't invest what you don't have, and you won't accept the risk of investment if the payoff is transferred away from you.

The agility of the American corporation is critical.  The right will argue that allowing the free market to function will fix the problem.  The free market does not guarantee social outcomes, merely economic ones.  In other words, it may give more efficiency on the whole and grow the economy as a whole, but by itself does not guarantee how the wealth is distributed.  The left cannot be indifferent to the historical consequences of extreme redistribution of wealth.  The right cannot be indifferent to the political consequences of a middle-class life being undermined, nor can it be indifferent to half the population's inability to buy the products and services that businesses sell.

The most significant actions made by government tend to be unintentional.  The GI Bill was designed to limit unemployment among returning servicemen; it inadvertently created a professional class of college graduates.  The VA Loan was designed to stimulate the construction industry; it created the basis for suburban home ownership.  The Interstate Highway System was meant to move troops rapidly in the event of war; it created a new pattern of land use that was suburbia.

It is unclear how the private sector can deal with the problem of pressure on the middle class.  Government programs frequently fail to fulfill even minimal intentions while squandering scarce resources.  The United States has been a fortunate country, with solutions frequently emerging in unexpected ways. [MLF: I call this the US being a "blessed" nation]  

It would seem to me that unless the United States gets lucky again, its global dominance is in jeopardy.  Considering its history, the United States might get lucky again, but it usually gets lucky when it is frightened.  And at this point it isn't frightened but angry, believing that if only its own solutions were employed, this problem and all others would go away.  I am arguing that the conventional solutions offered by all sides do not yet grasp the magnitude of the problem -- that the foundation of American society is at risk -- and therefore all sides are content to repeat what has been said before.

People that are smarter and luckier than I am will have to craft the solution.  I am simply pointing out the potential consequences of the problem and the inadequacy of all the ideas I have seen so far.           

  





Tuesday, January 22, 2013

A NATION OF SINGLES (Part 1)



A developing demographic trend over the entire western world is that our populations are getting older.  With careful examination one can find that the reasons include a falling birth rate, a falling fertility rate, a falling marriage rate and the explosion in singles (that is people that never get married).

Experts on this type of topic are reporting that the real eye-opener is the increase in singles is much more impactful on our future than is the birth rate and fertility rate.  As a surging percentage of US voters, singles are a game changer.  They see the world differently in terms of their own personal security and the future, as is confirmed by the way they vote.

To get a sense of how powerful the marriage effect is, not just for women but also for men, we can look at the exit polls by marital status.  Among non-married voters, Obama beat Romney 62% - 35%.  Among married voters Romney won the vote handily by a tune of 56% - 42%.

We all had a sense that singles as a group favored Obama, but by that much?  Singles are a new and rapidly rising part of the population that has not been well accounted for in a demographic sense.

Why is this discussion important?  As this trend of the growing single class continues, it will have extreme ramifications on how our entitlement programs and taxes will settle out.  As a nation, we want maximal healthcare and minimal taxes.  Healthcare benefits have to be paid for by someone, and that trade-off is going to be large in terms of taxes, capital formation, productivity, and employment.  It is hard to overstate the implications of how healthcare demographics will affect our economy now and decades to come.

BIRTH RATE FALLS

In 2011, the US birthrate fell to a record low while the marriage rate continued to tumble.  The number of single Americans is now at a record high.  The implications of these developments are troubling, not only for the economy but in other sectors as well.

Some people confuse birth rate (births/1000 women) with the fertility rate (ave. number of children born to a woman during her lifetime).  In 1957, during the peak of the baby boom the birth rate was at a peak of 123 births/1000 women.  Today it has fallen to an all-time low of 63 births/1000 women.  The fertility rate needed to maintain the current US population is 2.1 children born to women of child bearing age.  The current fertility rate is now only 1.9 children and falling.

Although the declining US birth rate has not created a stark imbalance as shown in graying countries such as Japan or Italy, it should serve as a wake-up call for policymakers.  Robert Suro, a professor of public policy at the University of Southern California who studies trends in birth rates has warned:

"We've been assuming that when the Baby-Boomer population gets most expensive [to support], that there are going to be [enough] immigrants and their children who are going to be paying into [programs for the elderly], but in the wake of what's happened in the last five years, we have to reexamine those assumptions."

The question is, why is the fertility rate falling faster in recent years, especially among immigrant women?  Experts often point to the recession and financial crisis which unfolded in late 2007.  The current failing fertility rate mirrors to some extent what has happened during other recessions.  But in past recessions, the birth rate increased again once the economy recovered.  So why is it not happening this time? (hmmm, maybe the economy has NOT recovered)

There are numerous possible answers.  Let's start with the plunge in birth rates among immigrants.  Almost half of all immigrants to the US are of Hispanic origin.  But in recent years, immigration from Mexico has essentially dried up.  For the first time since the Great Depression, the net migration from Mexico to the U.S. has been zero.

Latino immigrants who have been here longer tend to adopt US behaviors and attitudes, including smaller families.  The decline amongst Latino's is most likely related to enhanced access to birth control and easier access to abortion.

In the US, as in other advanced nations, people are running away from marriage, children, and the family life at an amazing rate.  For example, 30% of German women today say that they do not intend to have children.  In Japan in 1960, 20% of women between 25 and 29 had never married; today the number is more than 60%.  It is estimated that up to 25% of all East Asian women will remain single up to age 50, and up to a third will remain childless.

Are we on the verge of becoming Japan and Europe with an even more aged population?  Demographers, from east to west, say YES!

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Between 1910 and 1970, the "ever-married rate" went as high as 98.3% and never dipped below 92.8%.  But beginning in 1970, the ever-married number began a gradual decline so that by 2000 it stood at only 88.6%.

Today the numbers are even more striking, according to the 2010 Census.  Almost 24% of men, and 19% of women, between the ages of 35 and 44, have never been married.  If we look at the people between 20 and 34 (prime child bearing years), the numbers are even more startling:  67% of men and 57% of women in this group have never been married.  When all is said and done, over half of the voting-age population in America, and 40% of the people who actually voted this time around, are single. 

Very few political analysts emphasized how important the singles were to President Obama's reelection.  A lot of emphasis was put on the gender gap, but when counted, Obama won women by 11% whereas Romney won married women by the same exact margin.
Far more significant than the gender gap is the marriage gap. 

So what does this "singles" group look like?  Geographically, they tend to live in cities.  As urban density increases, marriage and birth rates fall in nearly a straight line.  Politicos James Carville and Stanley Greenberg put together some interesting data on singles.  Of the 111 million single eligible voters, 53 million are women and 58 million are men.  Only 5.7 million of these women are Hispanic and 9.7 million are African American.  Nearly 3/4 of all single women are white. 

Singles broke decisively for Obama, which was no surprise.  Though his margins with them were lower than they were in 2008, he still won them handily:  Obama was +16% among single men and +36% with single women.  But the real news wasn't how singles broke - it was that their share of the total vote increased by a whopping 6%.

That 6% increase meant 7.6 million more voters than in 2008.  They provided Obama with a margin of 2.9 million votes, which was 2/3 of his margin of victory.  We've heard so much about the increased share of the Hispanic voter, but it only increased about 1% from 2008 to 2012.  I'm sure Romney handlers are kicking themselves in the butt for missing this particular dynamic.

HOW DID WE BECOME A NATION OF SINGLES  

How did we get to an America where half of the population isn't married and somewhere between 10% and 15% of the population don't get married for the first time until they are approaching retirement?  This from Jonathan Last who did the research for an article found in the Weekly Standard:

"It is a complicated story involving marriage, among other factors, the rise of almost-universal higher education, the delay of marriage, urbanization, the invention of no-fault divorce, the legitimization of cohabitation, the increasing cost of raising children, the creation of a government entitlement system for the elderly childless to replace what grown children used to do for their parents.

But all of these causes are particular.  Looming beneath them all are two deep shifts.  The first is the waning of religion in American life.  As Joel Kotkin notes in a recent report titled ' The Rise of Post-Familialism,' one of the commonalities between all of the major world religions is that they elevate family and kinship to a central place in human existence.  Secularism tends toward agnosticism about the family.  This distinction has real-world consequences.  Take any cohort of Americans - by race, income, education - and them sort them by religious belief.  The more devout they are, the higher their rates of marriage and the more children they have.

The second shift is the dismantling of the iron triangle of sex, marriage, and childbearing.  Beginning in roughly 1970, the mastery of contraception decoupled sex from babymaking.  And with that link broken, the connections between sex and marriage - and finally between marriage and childbearing - were also severed.

Where is this trend line headed?  In a word, higher.  There are no indicators to suggest when and where it will level off.  Divorce rates have stabilized, but rates of cohabitation have continued to rise, leading many demographers to suspect that living together may be crowding out matrimony as a mode of family formation.  And increasing levels of education continue to push the average age at first marriage higher."  

The question, then, is whether America will continue following its glidepath to the destination the rest of the First World is already nearing.  Most experts believe that it will.  As the Austrian demographer Wolfgang Lutz put it, once a society begins veering away from marriage and childbearing, it becomes a "self-reinforcing mechanism" in which the cult of the individual holds greater and greater allure.

Johnathan Last continues:

"What then?  Culturally speaking, it's anybody's guess.  The more singletons we have, the more densely urban our living partners are likely to be.  Sociologist Eric Klinenberg believes that the masses of city-dwelling singles will sort themselves into 'urban tribes,' based not on kinship, but rather on shared interests.  The hipsters, the foodles, the dog people, and so on.  Klinenberg teaches at NYU, so he should know.  As a result, cities will gradually transform from centers of economic and cultural foment into what urban theorist Terry Nichols Clark calls 'the city as entertainment machine.'

The urban tribes may be insipid, but they are reasonably benign.  Kotkin sees larger cultural problems down the road.  '[A] society that is increasingly single and childless is likely to be more concerned with serving current needs than addressing the future,' he writes.  We could tilt more into a NOW society, geared towards consuming or recreating today, as opposed to nurturing and sacrificing for tomorrow."  (written by Kotkin, not originated by MLF). 

I want to add to what Mr. Kotkin has expressed.  I don't think anyone is saying that all single and childless adults have no concern for those who follow.  Using myself as an example, yes I care for the little ones in my community and what we leave for them, but I would actually fight to the death to secure the future of my own children and grandchildren.  In my opinion, this one factor has led to the many sacrifices that those in our nation's past have endured, even to death.  Also, to the detriment of our society, there are men and women with children that have absolutely no concern for their children's immediate welfare, much less any concern for their future.  I have and always will place strong and healthy family structures as the most important institution in our society.  

So what does this mean for the economy?  The economic effects are unclear.  On the one hand, judging from the booming economic progress in highly single countries such as Singapore and Taiwan, singleton's can work longer hours and move more easily for jobs.  On that level a more single society could be good for the economy.  But only for a period of time, as fewer babies are born to replace them.

There is another downside to this scenario of failing marriage rates and more singles in the workforce.  Demographers have found that without responsibility for families to provide for, unmarried American males have historically tended to drop out of the labor force prior to their normal retirement age, thus exacerbating recessionary tendencies in the economy.  Today's statistics of the unemployed show that married men's unemployment rate is much lower than the national rate, whereas the unemployment rate for single men is much higher than the national rate.  This dynamic of married man vs single man has perplexed observers for the last couple of generations.  From my personal perspective, it appears that men finally grow up when they have a wife and family as positive motivation.

During the American Industrial boom, observers from Europe came over to study the differences between the new nation as compared to the older nations of Europe.  Most of them gave much credence to the institution of marriage and religion as being foundational to what drove American's to be what they had become on the world stage.  Even today, survey after survey has shown that married people are happier, wealthier, and healthier than their single counterparts.  All of the research suggests that having married parents dramatically improves the well-being of children, both in their youth and later as adults.

As demographer Robert George stated after the election:

"..limited government cannot be maintained where the marriage culture collapses and families fail to form or easily dissolve.  Where these things happen, the health, education, and welfare functions of the family will have to be undertaken by someone, or some institution, and that will sooner or later be the government." 

Marriage is what made the West, and America in particular, so successful.  George continues:

"The two greatest institutions ever devised for lifting people out of poverty and enabling them to live in dignity are the [free] market economy and the institution of marriage.  These institutions will, in the end, stand or fall together." 

(slightly edited on 1/24/13  11:03am ; 2:05pm)